legal247

The good faith standard in Norwegian contract interpretation: when is a party bound?

In brief

Under the Norwegian good faith standard, one party's divergent understanding may prevail if the other party knew of it. In HR-2026-2465-A of 17 November 2026 the Supreme Court held that it is not enough that the other party ought to have understood. It must have understood, and between businesses the threshold is high, particularly where the party relying on the standard drafted the terms.

On 17 November 2026 the Norwegian Supreme Court gave a unanimous judgment in HR-2026-2465-A on the good faith standard (godtrostandarden) in the interpretation of contracts between businesses. A power supplier had unilaterally drafted an agreement on financial power portfolio management containing a provision that cut off the supplier’s entitlement to a performance-based fee, and the supplier argued that the provision had been left in the contract by mistake. The question was whether the customer was bound by the supplier’s understanding because the customer ought to have understood, or must have understood, what the supplier meant. Although the case concerned a power agreement, the court framed its reasoning as general principles for commercial contracts, and in our assessment the judgment is directly relevant to suppliers that rely on their own standard terms, including in IT and SaaS contracts governed by Norwegian law. It forms part of the material on the contracts topic page. The sections below address what the good faith standard is, where the threshold now lies, and what suppliers and customers should do.

What is the good faith standard under Norwegian law?

The good faith standard is an unwritten rule of interpretation under which one party’s particular understanding of a contract may prevail over the objective interpretation where the other party knew of that understanding. The Supreme Court held in para 21 that the standard is a normative assessment and not merely a rule of evidence concerning what the other party actually knew. It may therefore also bind a party that did not know of the other party’s understanding but, on a legal assessment, should be treated as having understood it. The starting point is that each party bears the risk of its own understanding where it does not correspond to the objective interpretation.

The main rule between businesses is objective interpretation. The court described this in para 17 as the clear main rule. In para 18 it referred to the summary in HR-2026-280-A (Isola), according to which commercial contracts are to be interpreted objectively with considerable weight on the wording, but also in light of their purpose, structure and context. The party asserting an understanding other than the objective one bears the burden of proof. Where the wording gives a clear answer, very good reasons are required to depart from it (para 19).

How high is the threshold for the good faith standard between businesses?

The Supreme Court settled that it is not sufficient that a party ought to have understood what the other party meant. The party must have understood it when the contract was concluded, and the threshold between businesses must be high. The court stated the position in para 32, which reads as follows in translation.

The good faith standard is a normative assessment. It is not sufficient that the party ought to have understood what the other party meant. It is required that the party, when the contract was concluded, must have understood what the other party meant.

The rationale is predictability. Under para 31, parties to commercial contracts must as a rule be able to rely on the wording without regard to subjective circumstances on the other side. The wider the scope given to the good faith standard, the narrower the scope of objective interpretation becomes. The court noted that under CISG article 8(1), as incorporated by Sale of Goods Act section 87, the other party is bound where it “could not have been unaware” of the intent. It also noted that section 89 of the Sale of Goods Act before 2014 used the test “understood or must have understood”. In the court’s view this regulation carries considerable weight by analogy (para 27). By contrast, the court found little guidance in section 32 of the Contracts Act. Under Contracts Act section 32 a declaration that has acquired an unintended content through a clerical or similar error is not binding where the recipient realised or ought to have realised the error. The court described the provision as a ground of invalidity with a narrow scope (para 28).

Which factors determine the assessment?

The assessment turns on whether the party can be criticised in a way that makes it appropriate, on grounds of loyalty, to hold it bound. Under para 33, weight is to be given to how clear the wording is, whether the contract was individually negotiated, how complex the contract or its subject matter is, and whether the parties are on an equal footing, including in terms of knowledge. Where the terms were set unilaterally and the party invoking the good faith standard has greater knowledge than the other party, the same paragraph states that a great deal is required before the standard can lead to an interpretation contrary to the objective one.

Factor Paras Effect
Clear wording 19 and 33 The clearer the wording, the more is required to depart from it
Unilaterally drafted terms 33, 34 and 51 The drafting party in principle bears the risk of its own assumptions
Difference in knowledge 33 and 51 Greater knowledge on the part of the party invoking the standard raises the bar
Complex commercial contract 33 and 51 Weighs against finding that the other party must have understood a divergent meaning
Pre-contractual correspondence 51 A good deal is required before an e-mail displaces the wording
Subsequent conduct 53 Says little about what the other party must have understood where one party drafted the contract

How was the good faith standard applied in the case?

The contract had been drafted by the supplier alone and was largely carried over from earlier agreements, and the supplier had around 50 similar agreements with other customers (para 34). Under the fifth paragraph of clause 10, no performance-based fee accrued if the annual portfolio price exceeded the reference price. The Supreme Court found the wording unambiguous and held that the objective interpretation could not be departed from (para 43). The supplier argued that the provision had mistakenly not been removed when the contract was redrafted at an earlier renewal, and that the customer must have understood or ought to have understood this (para 44).

The supplier relied in particular on an e-mail from April 2016 describing a new model for the performance-based fee. The Supreme Court found that the e-mail was not clear, and that it could not have appeared illogical or meaningless to the customer that the supplier also had to beat the reference price to earn the fee (paras 50 and 51). In the court’s view it was far more natural to let the supplier bear the risk of its own assumptions, because the contract was complex, the terms were set unilaterally and the supplier had far greater knowledge of the subject matter. The fact that the supplier had calculated its fee contrary to the wording during the contract period and reported this to the customer did not change the outcome (paras 52 and 53).

The supplier was ordered to pay out the withheld amount of NOK 2,065,435 with default interest and to pay the customer’s legal costs for three instances in the amount of NOK 2,509,032 (para 60). The Supreme Court did not address the customer’s alternative grounds, including revision under Contracts Act section 36 (para 55).

What does the judgment mean for IT and SaaS contracts?

In our assessment the judgment is particularly relevant to software and cloud suppliers that use their own standard terms, pricing models and service descriptions across many customers. Such terms are drafted unilaterally, they often regulate complex matters such as volume discounts, usage-based pricing, service levels and service credits, and the supplier normally knows the service better than the customer. That is precisely the constellation in which the Supreme Court requires a great deal before a divergent understanding can prevail. An error that survives a revision of the terms will therefore normally be borne by the supplier.

The judgment also weakens the argument that a customer has accepted the supplier’s understanding by paying invoices or receiving reports without objection. The Supreme Court emphasised that the amounts were so moderate that they gave the customer no reason to examine their basis, and that the reporting concerned ongoing management and not the final settlement (para 53). Similarly, a monthly invoice for a cloud service will rarely justify interpreting away a clear contractual provision. The judgment sits comfortably alongside the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling on references to standard terms in the Rototec case, since both place the risk of ambiguity and error on the party that drafted the terms.

The judgment does not, however, allow a customer to exploit an error of which it actually knew. Under para 30 the core of the good faith standard is the situation where a party knows how the other party understands the contract, and the high threshold applies only where such knowledge cannot be proved. If the customer indicated in negotiations or correspondence that it understood what the supplier meant, the standard may still apply.

What should suppliers and customers do?

Suppliers should treat every renewal or redraft of their standard terms as a new contract and check that the provisions on fees, discounts, liability and termination are consistent. In our assessment the judgment means that an error left in place after a redraft may become binding across the entire contract portfolio. The following steps reduce the risk.

  1. Review the fee and settlement provisions as a whole whenever the standard terms are amended, and confirm that older paragraphs intended to be removed have in fact been deleted.
  2. Describe changes to the pricing model in the contract text itself and not only in e-mails, presentations or attachments that are not contract documents.
  3. Specify in the contract which document prevails in the event of conflict between the contract text, the price schedule and the service description.
  4. Correct an identified error by written amendment agreed with customers rather than by invoicing according to the supplier’s own understanding.

Customers should record the understanding of fees and settlement on which they relied when the contract was concluded, and check any final settlement on termination against the wording of the contract. Where a supplier claims on termination an amount that has no basis in the wording, HR-2026-2465-A provides a strong basis for demanding repayment, even where the supplier has applied the contract according to its own understanding throughout the contract period.

Questions and answers

Does the good faith standard apply where the other party actually knew of the error?

Yes. The core of the good faith standard is the situation where a party knows how the other party understands the contract. The Supreme Court stated in para 30 that it is then clearly disloyal to rely on a different understanding later. The high threshold set by the judgment applies where actual knowledge cannot be shown and the question is what the party must have understood.

Can a supplier correct an error in its terms by invoicing according to its own understanding?

Hardly. The power supplier had calculated its fee contrary to the wording and reported this to the customer monthly, but the Supreme Court held in para 53 that subsequent conduct says little or nothing about what the other party must have understood where the contract was drafted by one party alone. In our assessment the error should therefore be corrected by amending the contract.

How does the good faith standard differ from section 32 of the Contracts Act?

Section 32 of the Contracts Act is a rule of invalidity for declarations that, through a clerical or similar error, have acquired a content that was not intended, and it applies where the recipient realised or ought to have realised the error. The Supreme Court described it in para 28 as a ground of invalidity with a narrow scope that offers little guidance on the good faith standard as a principle of interpretation.

Next legal review: 31 May 2027